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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
other business entity. Perhaps this is as it should be. It follows that
those who lean toward the professions, whether they be doctors, lawyers,
architects or others, should recognize a new tenet: the paths of profes-
sional glory lead but to liability.
GEORGE M. WrTE
Indeterminate Sentencing - Half.Step Toward
Science in Law
I am a man
More sinned against than sinning1
might well have been the lament of the convicted criminal a few decades
ago. History abounds with accounts of inhuman and savage methods of
punishing criminals. The modern social sciences have studied the social
problem of crime and the criminal personality; they have concluded that
the criminal is bred by social conditions and that society can better pro-
tect itself from crime by reforming criminals rather than punishing
them. Today's penal legislation is a partial adoption of the knowledge of
social science, but complete adoption has been obstructed 'by the lingering
prejudices and ignorance of yesterday when punishment was the solution
to crime.
The intent of this note is to outline the development of today's
sentencing laws, to generally explain the early notions of punishment and
the modern theory of reformation, and to point out how remnants of
those early notions have impeded the progress of science in law.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCING LAWS
The American Prison Association held its first meeting in 1870 to
discuss the new penal systems and theories that had been innovated in
Bavaria, Australia and Ireland.2 It was prevalent methodology at this
time to punish criminals for their crimes by confining them in penal
institutions where they were deprived of the conveniences and company
of the society they had wronged. But a new school of thought, crimi-
nology, had developed the idea that it was not the criminal who had
wronged society, but rather that society had wronged the criminal by in-
flicting upon him adverse environmental influences that molded his
1. King Lear.
2. Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Setence and Parole System, 16
J. CRlM. L., C & P.S. 9, 18 (1926).
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criminality3 They reasoned that society could eliminate crime 'by re-
forming the criminal personality, by replacing and-social personality traits
with acceptable social traits; that as each criminal was a unique personality
due to his unique environment, the treatment of each would be unique
the theory of individualization of punishment.4
The American Prison Association condoned the arguments of the
European criminologists and the first American reformatory was estab-
lished at Elmira, New York in 1877. Other states soon followed the
New York experiment in penology,6 'but the then existing sentencing laws
were not suitable to the needs of reformation: convicted criminals were
sentenced for a definite period of time which was determined by the
penalty called for in the statute defining the crime; this "fixed sentence"
was not suitable to individualization in that the time needed to rehabili-
tate a particular offender might be more or less than the duration of the
sentence. To partially remedy this incongruity, indeterminate sentencing
legislation was passed which provided for a period of detention with
minimum and maximum limits - e.g., five to twenty years - and
prison parole boards were given the authority to release the sufficiently
rehabilitated offender at any time within those limits.Y
Today's indeterminate sentencing laws vary from jurisdiction to juris-
diction with the result that each jurisdiction has a combination of laws
that makes its system somewhat unique." However, all the systems of
sentencing can be arranged to fall within one of three general patterns:9
1) The statute defining the particular crime provides for minimum
and maximum limits - e.g., one to twenty years - and the judge is re-
quired to pronounce the "general sentence." The convicted can be re-
leased at any time between one and twenty years upon the determination
of the parole board. The parole procedure is distinct from, and comple-
mentary to, the sentencing procedure; the former is the function of
penology while the latter is a judicial process. The judiciary has the dis-
cretion to suspend the sentence by granting probation in the particular
case.
2) The statute defining the crime declares the maximum limit of the
3. See generally, FERIl, CRRINAL SOCIOLOGY (1917); LOMBROSO, CRIME ITS
CAusEs AND REMEDIEs (1918); SALEiLLEs, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUN-
ISHIMENT (1911); TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPIY (1912).
4. Ibid.
5. N.Y. LAws ch. 173 (1857).
6. lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole System, 16
J. CRi. L C. & P.S. 9, 30 (1926).
7. Id. at 9; Note, 7 DUKE LJ. 65 (1958); Note, 50 HARv. L. REV. 677 (1936).
8. Note, 50 HAR. L. REv. 677 (1936).
9. Id. at 679-82.
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sentence and allows the court or the jury to set the minimum limit. The
provisions for parole and probation are the same as in No. 1.
3) The statute authorizes the court or jury to fix both the minimum
and the maximum limits of the sentence, and again there are the usual
provisions for parole and probation.
One feature all the jurisdictions share is the legislative reluctance to
fully adopt the theory of individualization of punishment. No jurisdic-
tion has a truly indeterminate sentence whereby a convicted criminal is
placed in a penal institution until the penal authorities decide that he is
sufficiently rehabilitated to be returned to society.
True Ind terminate Sentencing
A few jurisdictions, however, have experimented with true inde-
terminate sentencing in a very limited area - youthful offenders. 10 The
American Law Institute has fully adopted the idea of individualization of
punishment for youthful offenders in its proposed Model Penal Code."
Youths who exceed the maximum age of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
and are less than twenty-one years old, are to be within the concurrent juris-
diction of the criminal courts and a youth authority.12 A preliminary
examination decides whether the individual is susceptible to rehabilitative
treatment; if he is, he is placed with the youth authority which will guide
and evaluate his training and decide when he shall be ultimately re-
turned to society - this procedure is the only true instance of individual-
ization of punishment in the United States. On the other hand, if the
preliminary examination leads to the determination that the individual
is not suited to the treatment facilities of the youth authority, he will be
turned over to the criminal court to be sentenced in accordance with the
criminal code.
The "Youth Correction Acts" and the related rehabilitative treatment
are in the earliest experimental stages. Other jurisdictions would do well
to study their experiences and learn from their successes and failures,' 3
and apply those lessons in drafting future indeterminate sentencing legis-
lation.
The Accumulation of "Sentencing" Knowledge
The legislature's partial adoption of the philosophy of the individuali-
zation of punishment is an instance of true scientific experiment with a
10. Youth Correction Acts have been enacted in California, Wisconsin, Illinois
and for the federal system.
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.05 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1957).
12. Id. § 4.10.
13. E.g., Holton, California Youth Authority: Eight Years of Action, 41 J. CRIM.
L, C. & P.S. 1 (1950).
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social problem. The hypothesis that crime can be prevented 'by fitting
the punishment to the individual14 has been modified and put into practice
in the present indeterminate sentence. The experience of the law, social
case workers and penologists showed that some modifications and addi-
tions should complement the indeterminate sentence. The result is a
realistic approach to the crime problem by the dynamic interchange of
experiences among law enforcement agencies, the courts, and social
scientists. This can best 'be illustrated by showing the sentencing
"scheme" of a single jurisdiction.
The Ohio indeterminate sentence calls for the court to pronounce the
general sentence set forth in the statute defining the particular crime.15
While the court has no discretion in setting the upper or lower limits of
the sentence, it does have the discretion of suspending the sentence by
ordering the convicted to be placed on probation.' 6 Probation itself is an
interaction of judicial and social-science experience in that the judge, in
considering the suspension of a felony sentence, must require a written
investigative report by a probation officer 'before he exercises his discre-
tion.'7 If probation is denied, the convicted will 'be sentenced to a penal
institution and when the penal authorities and parole board determine
that he is satisfactorily rehabilitated, he will be released sometime dur-
ing the period of the general sentence.' 8 If they determine that he has
not been rehabilitated, he will be detained for the maximum period of
the sentence.
In addition to the indeterminate sentence-probation-parole com-
plex, the experiences of the various disciplines of police, courts, social
case workers, penologists, and psychologists have led to certain generaliza-
tions about the possible rehabilitation of convicted criminals. These ex-
periential conclusions have been codified and consequently save time and
expense by excluding certain classes of criminals from the individualiza-
tion process. Their experience has shown -that where a criminal has
several felony convictions his possibilities of rehabilitation are slight,
and, to protect the public from these incorrigibles, "habitual offender"
laws' 9 have been enacted. A criminal convicted of three felonies must be
sentenced for the maximum term provided for in the statute defining the
felony of which he is convicted for the third time,20 while a fourth felony
14. See SALEiLLEs, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMrrN (1911).
15. OHIo REv. CODE § 5145.01.
16. Id. 55 2951.02-.03.
17. Id. 5 2951.03.
18. Id. ch. 2965, §§ 2965.01-.34.
19. Id. §§ 2949.34, 2961.11-.12.
20. Id. § 2969.12.
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conviction demands a life-sentence.2 1 Those persons convicted of crimes
which experience has shown to be usually caused by personality disorders
of a very serious and dangerous nature may not be placed on probation,
e.g., sexual deviates. 22
Despite the above "practical" sentencing scheme which is the result
of the combined experiences of law and the social sciences, legislatures have
been reluctant to enact true indeterminate sentencing laws. Some cau-
tion that the social sciences are not to be relied on as they are not truly
sciences. 23 It is folly to expect the social sciences to predict social and
human reactions with the same degree of accuracy that physical sciences
predict physical results. The end to be attained by the social sciences is
a more effective control of crime while possibly salvaging a human be-
ing from a life of criminality. The present sentencing laws hinder free
experimentation in that courts and legislatures have determined who shall
be received in penal institutions and how long they shall be there.
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
Science, and particularly social science, is a relatively new means for
man's dealing with his environment. The scientific attitude has yet to
permeate the thinking of the "layman" who guides his action by habit,
platitudes, moralisms and old wives' tales. And lawyers have been trained
in precedents that were made in a society dominated by such thinking.
While social science has discovered that criminals are the waste prod-
ucts of social influences and that they can be reformed to be useful citi-
zens, the public and the law still tend to view them as they did in times
preceding science. New ideas that question the old order are inhospitably
received: Greeks poisoned Socrates, Jews crucified Jesus, and Christians
persecuted Copernicus and Galileo, etc.
The remainder of this section is but a brief summary of the four
basic attitudes toward criminal punishment in an attempt to show the
"hereditary" attitude of the public and the law and to contrast that with
the scientific attitude.
The Attitude of Vengence 4
When John hits Joe, Joe "rights" the wrong by hitting back, i.e., Joe
avenges himself. In man's early history, this was law in action, the law
21. Id. S 2969.12.
22. Id. 5 2959.04.
23. Glueck, Princ pds of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L REv. 453, 462
(1928).
24. POLLACK AND MAITLAND, II HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAw 4 (2d ed.
1952); SALEILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT, 20-26 (1911).
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of self preservation. Early societies had this precedent to act on. At one
time a wrong was only a wrong against the individual; there was no
distinction between crime and tort. The method of righting the wrong
was to require the injured or his kin to exact compensation from the
wrongdoer.2 5 But there were some wrongs that were not compensable;
for these the group exacted vengeance against the wrongdoer by taking
his property and his life - "outlawry" in the early English law. 8
Such emotionally laden punishment is quite understandable in view
of man's limited knowledge of the human personality and the personal
nature of law in a society that was so loosely organized.
Free Will and Moral Responsribility27
Scholastic philosophers, particularly Aquinas,28 taught that man had
a free will, that is, -the ability to deliberately choose his actions. They
said that an individual knows whether a particular act will have a
morally good or morally bad effect; therefore, a man who chooses to do
an act that -has a bad effect, a crime for instance, is morally responsible;
society has then been offended by a deliberately criminal act and has the
right to exact moral retribution by punishing the offender.
It is significant that this idea of moral responsibility is inherent in
our criminal laws. As the king's peace was spreading over England, the
common law courts began enunciating formulas for criminal felonies.
The first felonies were those very outrages that were remedied by out-
lawry prior to the common law; then the courts started characterizing
felonious acts as "wicked"; it then became an element of most felonies
that the actor have a "guilty intent."' g8 This intent to do a felonious act
presupposes the individual to have the ability to know that his act is
wrongful and consequently the courts will punish him because he chose
to do the wrongful act. This is dearly the idea of the moral responsi-
bility of the individual and that society punishes him as an act, of retribu-
tion.
The Idea of Punishment as a Deterrent
The early Nineteenth Century was generally a time of social skepti-
25. Ibid.
26. POLLOC(K AND MAITLAND, II HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAw 451 (2d ed.
1952).
27. SALEILLES, THE INDIVMUALIZATION OF PUNIsHuMEN 63-73, 165-75;
TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY 83-148 (1912).
28. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Quest, 83 (1274).
29. POLLOCK AND MArrLAND, II HISTRY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 468 (2d ed.
1952).
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cism.Y° Beccaria questioned and criticized the judicial guilt-finding pro-
cedure and the reasons for which society punished criminals, i.e., moral
retribution.31 During this period punishment was decreed by the judge
upon his own finding as to how "guilty" the criminal was. Beccaria was
aghast at this subjective standard and wrote that -the judge decided the
punishment on the basis of "the intention of the accused; the dignity of
the person offended; and the greatness of the sin."32  He said that a
particular decision was the "... . result of the good or bad logic of the
judge and this will depend on his good or bad digestion; on the violence
of his passions; on the rank and condition of the abused, or on his con-
nections with the judge; and on all the circumstances which change the
appearance of objects in the fluctuating mind of man."'3s
Beccaria suggested that the subjectiveness of punishment should ,be
replaced by legislation declaring a specific punishment for a specific
crime.a4 The argument for this legislation was in step with the spirit of
the Nineteenth Century that all men should be treated by the law as
equals.
Jeremy Bentham was another strong advocate of penal legislation in
which the "punishment fits the crime." He suggested that the punish-
ment for a particular crime should be great enough that the threat of its
infliction would outweigh the possible fruits of the crime, and, in this
way, the possibility of punishment would deter the criminal act.s 5
The Idea of Reformation
The three previous theories have one common feature: that the of-
fender has acted intelligently in choosing to commit a crime, and because
of this maliciousness he must 'be punished. Crhninologists like Lombroso,
and Saleilles analyzed the causes of crime by studying voluminous statistics
and found that most "criminal types" had something else in common -
an unfavorable environmental background. The earlier theories were
based on untested opinions that criminals were criminals -because they
chose to be; but the criminologists have factual evidence based on statistics
and the study of individual cases36
30. Voltaire, Rousseau, Locke, etc.
31. BECcARIA, CRIMES AND PUNIsHMENTs (1872); MONACHESIE, Pioneers In
Criminology - Becarwia, 46 J. CRIM. L, C. & P.S. 439 (1956).
32. BEcCARIA, CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTs 33 (1872).
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 461; Monachesie, Pioneers In Criminology - Beccaria, 46 J. CRIM. L,
C. & P.S. 439 (1956).
35. COHEN AND COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
332 (1951).
36. See generally, FEMRR, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY (1917); LOMBROSO, CRIME ITS
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The idea of individualization of punishment is used as if it were
synonymous with the idea of reformation; but the latter is only a part
of the .former. Individualization means simply that each individual should
be treated uniquely; in many cases unique treatment will mean an at-
tempt at rehabilitation, but in others rehabilitation is not feasible and is
not considered 37 Therefore, the reader should be aware that reformation
is only one aim of penology; its advocates do not present -it as the solu-
tion to the criminal problem, but only as a factor in easing the social
problem while benefiting the individual delinquent.
The idea of reformation 'is directly opposed to the free-will doctrine.
The psychology of determinism 8 holds that the criminal does not choose
his anti-social 'behavior as he chooses to move a chess-piece, -but rather
that his environment has educated him -in such a way that 'he knows of
no other way to act; his behavior has been determined by his prior ex-
periences. This is not to say that the individual has no control over his
behavior; he can still think over the alternatives available -to 'him, but
the alternatives that he can think of and the means of carrying them out
are determined along an anti-social path because that is 'the extent of his
learning, e.g., an individual, reared in a slum where young men steal
what they desire and 'hate "cops," 'has learned to get what -he wants by
stealing and that "cops" are his enemies who are there to frustrate his
desires and to plague and persecute him. It is true that this individual
chooses to rob and steal, and is not insane in the sense that he is the
victim of an uncontrollable impulse. Nevertheless, he has learned to be-
have in this way rather than in a more social way because of his school-of-
hard-knocks education. It is in this sense that criminality -has been
determined 'by the individual's personal experiences. The aim of penology
is to evaluate the offender in the light of his environment, and personal
abilities, such as intelligence, and to then determine whether he can be
rehabilitated.
The idea of reformation has also been described in terms of personal
CAUSES AND RENMDIs (1918); SALELLs, THE INDrIVDUALiZATION or PUNISH-
MENT (1911); TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY (1912); WAITE, THE PREVENTION
oF REPEATED CRimE (1943).
37. E.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) where there was a con-
viction for murder while perpetrating the burglary of an inhabited dwelling. The
jury recommended mercy but the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's order for
the death penalty under the theory of individualization. The trial judge based the
sentence upon the reports of probation officers and police statements that the accused
had been involved in some thirty burglaries.
38. Andennaes, Determinism and Criminad Law, 47 J. CRiM. L., C. & P. S. 406
(1957). See generally, ALMEANDER AND HEALY, ROOTS OF CIIME (1935);
ALANDER AND STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC (1931).
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maturity.39 The criminal personality is immature in the sense that the
criminal is not "trained" to adjust his infantile and selfish impulses to
the routine "give and take" of life in society. While a personality is im-
mature rehabilitation is possible. However, immature habits in an adult
personality can become so engrained that the anti-social 'behavior is
classified as psychotic. The problem is then exceedingly more difficult
if not impossible. The combined experiences of law, penology and case
workers have recognized the "practical" problem presented -by the psy-
chotic criminal as is evidenced by the "habitual offender" statutes.
THE NEED FOR FURTHER LEGAL UTILIZATION OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
The present sentencing procedure is a dynamic operation wherein the
courts rely not only on the "experience of the law" but also on the ex-
perience and knowledge of the social sciences. There are still extant,
however, remnants of a less enlightened period of criminal law: a criminal
code that has its roots in ideas of moral responsibility and provides for
a minimum and maximum limit to the sentence which impedes the in-
dividualization of punishment; judicial discretion is exercised in several
instances where the discretion should be in a party better trained in the
social sciences.
Legislation
The present sentencing laws providing for the upper and lower limits
of the sentence are incompatible with the theory of individualization.
Under the present laws, a dangerous criminal is released after he has
served the maximum statutory period while the same individual might
possibly be permanently confined if a truly indeterminate sentence law
were in effect; at the other extreme, an offender, not placed on probation
by a judge, must serve the minimum term provided by statute despite the
fact that psychologists and peno-correctional professionals may consider
him to be rehabilitated in a much shorter period of time.
An argument advanced for the retention of the present laws is that
some period of confinement must be threatened to deter individuals from
committing crimes. Law enforcement personnel and lawyers are said to
view the purpose of punishment as deterrence while psychologists are op-
posed to that view 'by their adherence to reformation.40 This is merely
the usual pseudo-conflict between practice and theory. There is no con-
39. BROMBERG, CRim AND THE MIND (1948).




flict between the groups; they are each concerned with distinct and sepa-
rate phases of the criminal problem - law enforcement on the one hand
and penology on the other. The possibility of being sentenced should
prove a sufficient deterrent to those few criminals who are mathematically
calculating, in fact, the possibility of life-long detention if rehabilitation
is considered impossible should be more deterring than the threat of the
usual minimum-maximum sentence.
The more serious obstacle to further legislation seems to be .the public
attitude. The knowledge and theory of modern psychology has not yet
trickled into the arena of life in society. The non-scientific public, which
includes most lawyers and legislators, have grown up in an environment
that teaches that criminals are "bad" and deserve to be punished: they
also are caught in the web of psychological determinism in that their en-
vironment has determined their attitude toward crime. The language
which is used to describe a phenomenon seriously prejudices our opinions:
If a person is described as a ruthless egoist, cynically exploiting others for
his own ends, the moralizing terms used create an impression of a high
degree of guilt and a well merited punishment. The situation is entirely
different if the same person is described in psychiatric terms, for example,
a psychopath, emotionally frigid with reduced powers of empathy and
self-control . 41
And it has been suggested that the public's harsh regard for criminals
is even more personal than the vocabulary they have been exposed to:
The criminal thus becomes a handy scapegoat upon which he (the
citizen) can transfer his feeling of his own tendency to sinfulness and
thus by punishing the criminal he deludes himself into a feeling of
righteous indignation, thus bolstering up his own self-respect. ... The
legal punishment of the criminal today is, in its psychology a dramatic
tragic action by which society pushes off its criminal impulses upon a
substitute. The principle is the same as that by which an emotion such
as anger is discharged upon an inoffensive lifeless object.4 2
The principal obstacle to a true indeterminate sentence is not intelli-
gent opposition to the theory of individualization, but rather the inerita
of the uninformed mind which cherishes the "tried and true" and clings
doggedly to yesterday's ignorance and superstitions.
Judicial Discretion
All those who deceive themselves into the belief that they put any thing
but their own personalities in their work are the dupes of the most
fallacious of illusions. The truth is that we can never get outside our-
41. Andennaes, Determinism and the Criminal Law. 47 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 406,
412 (1957).
42. WMrr, INSANITY AND THE CRIMNAL LAw 13 (1923).
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selves.... We are shut up in our own personalities as if in a perpetual
prison.43
The judge in setting the maximum or minimum limits of a sentence, or
in suspending the sentence, can base his decision only on his own knowl-
edge and experiences. Knowledge is rapidly increasing in all endeavors
and judges and lawyers cannot be expected to have even an inkling of
technical knowledge in all fields. Does that mean the law must close
its eyes to what others know? If not, the only way of introducing
"special" knowledge into law is to rely more fully on competent people
who have specialized in the particular fiel. 44  In the area of criminal
sentencing the judge's discretion should be reduced, or eliminated, and
replaced with the discretion of social scientists.
The discretion of the trial judge has been questioned by members of
the bench who have questioned the ability of judges to make decisions
any more rationally than other men, for "judges are not a race apart. The
hidden factors in the inferences and opinions of ordinary men are those
of the judge."45 It would seem that prejudices based on vengeance and
moral retribution that cause ordinary men to be unsympathetic to the
criminal's psychology are also the prejudices of many judges.
In a statistical survey of minor criminal cases decided by the several
judges of the City Magistrate's Court in New York City, the result in-
dicated that there is a "personal equation." In intoxication cases one
judge found as many as 97% of the parties -guilty while another found
only 21% guilty; and in vagrancy cases the guilty findings ranged from
21% to 95.5%, and in the disorderly conduct cases the range was from
46% to 82%. 41 In minor criminal cases such uncertain justice might be
tolerable, but when a prison sentence is involved, such judicial uncertainty
is undesirable. Professionals trained and specializing in criminal prob-
lems are better qualified to pass sentence on convicted criminals than are
"law-trained" judges.
CONCLUSION
The social sciences have made great advances in the study of crime.
The crime rate should be reduced by the law's fullest utilization of that
knowledge, but to adopt that knowledge seems to be a secondary task
which must follow the purge of deeply-rooted ideas of vengeance and
43. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 15 (1930), quoting Anatole France.
44. COHEN AND COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
549 (1951).
45. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 105 (1930); See also, FRANK, COURTS
ON TRiAL (1949).
46. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 112 (1930).
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